A NOVEL TRI-FACTOR MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION WITH BIOMETRICS FOR WIRELESS BODY SENSOR NETWORKS IN HEALTHCARE APPLICATIONS by He, Chen-Guang et al.
  
A NOVEL TRI-FACTOR MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION WITH 
BIOMETRICS FOR WIRELESS BODY SENSOR NETWORKS IN 
HEALTHCARE APPLICATIONS 
 
Chen-Guang He
1, 2
, Shu-Di Bao
3, 1, *
, and Ye Li
1
 
1. Shenzhen Institutes of Advanced Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Nanshan Zone 
Guangdong, China, 518055 
2. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Shijingshan Zone 
Beijing, China, 100049 
3. School of Electron and Information Engineering 
Ningbo University of Technology, Haishu Zone 
Zhejiang, China, 315010 
Emails: cg.he@siat.ac.cn; shudi.bao@gmail.com; ye.li@siat.ac.cn 
 
 
   Submitted: Sep. 29, 2012          Accepted: May 16, 2013                     Published: June 5, 2013 
 
 
 
Abstract - User authentication, as a fundamental security protocol, has been addressed with more 
concerns recently. Unlike normal authentication processes invoked by a user to access the network, 
biosensors with healthcare applications normally need to be validated automatically, followed by data 
transmission to the remote server without any explicit request. Hence, implied authentication procedure 
involved in such application scenarios shall be addressed. In this paper, a novel tri-factor user 
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authentication protocol with mutual access is proposed for the body sensor networks (BSN) in 
healthcare application. It is demonstrated that the proposed protocol has its advantages over the 
existing two-factor user authentication schemes. 
 
Index terms: BSN, Biosensor, Mutual Authentication, Security, Pattern Vector. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless sensors devices are more and more widely used in various aspects of our social life, 
such as traffic monitoring, meteorological survey, resource protection, manufacturing and 
healthcare systems. With the development of sensor and network technologies, wireless sensor 
networks (WSN) is also by far the best fundamental infrastructure as the perception layer during 
the construction of the Internet of Things (IoT). In almost all cases, security of WSN is a key 
issue due to the fact that the sensors can be deployed in most of the environments being with the 
ubiquitous and widespread characteristics as well as accessed either in complex communication 
situation or by a remote mode. For the valuable and important data collected from the sensors in 
terms of battle field status, national resource analysis and health status of persons, it is 
unacceptable that the communication process are broken and messages are leaked or blurred 
being under the adversaries’ attack. However, since sensors are usually configured with scanty 
resources including limited power energy and memory capacity, complicated cryptography 
methods are not feasible for securing WSN in most cases. A powerful but resource-saving 
security protocol is very crucial. Although there has been significant progress gained in WSN 
about security of link and network layers, application layer security, which is a basic requirement 
in many application scenarios, is more or less neglected [1]. Therefore, security is still an open 
issue for WSN at every level of network infrastructure, which actually becomes an urgent 
requirement to be met with, especially in applications of healthcare, where wireless biosensors 
arranged on human body to form a wireless body sensor network (BSN) to play a key role in 
medical and healthcare monitoring. 
User authentication is deployed as a basic solution to implement the data access control, 
especially in the password-based authentication scheme. It is adopted for remote user 
authentication [2]. A pair of user identifier and password, as one kind of secure factor, can meet 
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the security requirement of information system to some extent. However, for critical systems 
such as battle environment or special applications like mobile healthcare services, it is not nearly 
enough. Theoretically, the more independent secure factors combined together and introduced 
into the scheme, the more difficult for adversaries to attack it. Consequently, more and more 
multi-factor user authentication schemes have been introduced [3, 4], which usually authenticate 
users by two distinct factors considering of the computing and management overhead. Chang and 
Wu [5] firstly proposed a scheme using smart card as another factor during the authentication 
process, and Das [1] proposed a practical two-factor user authentication protocol in WSN. In 
general, smart card is regarded as a physical device and issued to the user who first registers to a 
system with the capable of powerful computing and lager memory capacity [6]. 
This study focuses on the context of wireless biosensors applications for human health 
monitoring with mobile network access to remote services. The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. Previous works about two-factor user authentication are summarized in 
Section II. We introduce the application scenarios and the basis of biometric method, and then 
propose a mutual authentication protocol for securing communications between sensors and a 
remote server in Section III, followed by the protocol analysis and implementation in Section IV. 
Conclusions are finally given in last Section. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
 
Since Chang et al [5] proposed to use a smart card to accomplish the authentication procedure, it 
has been studied in plenty of literatures to be applied into security protocols for access control. 
As far as the wireless sensor network is concerned, Benenson et al. [7] had first sketched several 
security issues in WSNs, especially about the access control and proposed the notion of n-
authentication. Hwang and Li [8] proposed a scheme based on ID cryptosystems. Chan et al.
 
[9] 
then analyzed the flaws of this scheme and indicated that it was vulnerable to the impersonation 
attack. Subsequently, Awasthi and Lal [10] presented a remote user authentication scheme using 
smart cards with forward secrecy in 2003. However, Lee et al. [11] pointed out that Awasthi’s 
protocol was incorrect being lacking the ways to get time factor involved in verification phase. 
Das et al. [2] proposed their scheme and claimed that it was not necessary to maintain a password 
and verification table. Unfortunately, Awasthi
 
gave an attack model [12] illustrated that anyone 
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could access system with an arbitrary password input, which implied Das’ protocol was very 
vulnerable. Again, Das proposed a new protocol used two-factor user authentication scheme in 
2009. Huang et al.[13] enhanced this scheme’s capability of anti-eavesdropping by increasing the 
computing time. Kumar [14] presented an efficient framework under predetermined strict 
conditions, which however are assumptions over practical utilization. In 2010, Khan and 
Alghathbar [15] reviewed comprehensively Das’ scheme for its security properties, and proposed 
an improved protocol which was claimed to be strong enough to resist attacks. 
If user password can indicate what you know, then smart card indicates what you have. Source 
address analysis can guarantee where you are and physiological characteristic, especially based 
on the physiological signals sampled by biosensors from inner or outside of the body area, can 
directly shows who you are. Adams and Wiener [16] used two partial encrypted key seeds 
derived from a plurality of biometric input to merge a finally cipher key based on the error 
correction. Bhargav-Spantzel [17] proposed a two-phase authentication mechanism in which the 
first one consists of a two-factor biometric authentication based on zero knowledge proofs, and 
the second one combines several authentication factors in conjunction with the biometric features 
to provide a strong authentication. 
Signal features of electroencephalograph (EEG) and electrocardiograph (ECG) were also 
proposed to be an irrefutable evidence [18, 19] for user authentication. Suﬁ and Khalil [20] 
proposed a novel method of ECG biometric generated from compressed ECG harnessing data 
mining techniques like feature selection and clustering. Gu et al. [21] worked out a method using 
photoplethysmograph (PPG) signals to distinguish human individuals in 2003. Poon [22] and Bao 
et al. [23] proposed and improved a scheme using interpulse intervals (IPIs) of heartbeats to 
generate entity identifiers (EIs) for mutual authentication among sensors in the same body area, 
respectively. Miao [24] and Cao et al. [25] subsequently proposed key distribution schemes with 
improved recognition rate of EIs. Nevertheless, authentication protocol whatever for sensors or 
users should also be addressed in the application layer. Recently, Shen et al. [26] design a rapid 
way to identify one’s ECG. Overall security solutions across the multi-gateway networks are still 
research hotspots, and the existing studies under different network environments can be referred 
to each other [3, to achieve strong authentication adequately, as well as some researches of 
trusted signature framework [29] in wireless sensor networks.  
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III. APPLICATION SCENARIOS AND PROTOCOL 
 
a. Application Requirements 
Before illustrate our work, any symbol and its meaning used in this paper are shown in Table 1 . 
 
Table 1: List of notions and symbols used in the proposed protocol 
 
Symbols Notions 
BSn Body Sensor nodes 
SE Sever End  
MGW Mobile Gateway node 
User 
Oi The i
th  
pattern of Owner 
Sj The j
th
 body sensor node 
Uk The k
th  
User 
PWk Password of the k
th  
user 
PVi Pattern Vector of the i
th  
owner 
IDk Login ID of the k
th  
user 
CID Compound Identifier 
xa 
A different session key according to different 
applications pre-stored in the MGW and BSn 
K A symmetric Key, permanent 
h(.) One-way hash function 
|| Bitwise concatenation 
⊕ XOR operation 
A→B:M A sends M to B through an unsecure channel 
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A B:M A sends M to B through a secure channel 
Contemporary mobile devices are getting more and more powerful and intelligent that can act as 
a key gateway node which connects monitoring sensor nodes with a remote server. In many 
cases, a mobile device can also be regarded as a sharing device among a certain group of people, 
e.g. a whole family or a clinic unit. Similar to general User-Gateway-Sensor structures, the 3-
layer infrastructure for mobile healthcare systems consists of Server End (SE), Mobile Gateway 
(MGW) and Body Sensor nodes (BSn). However, the SE always plays a dual role, passive and 
active, in which the former is providing services when the MGW invokes requests and the latter 
can accesses the sensors actively after being authenticated by the MGW. Mutual login must be 
introduced into SE, which is logging or logged in. Furthermore, people who want to check their 
health status from SE or BSn via mobile devices directly should be permitted after being 
authenticated. Though a pair of user identifier and password is the traditional method for this 
purpose, inputting password is sometimes inconvenient or even impossible with biometric 
characteristics outside the body, such as fingerprint for a physically disabled person. Hence, 
using more general biometrics as a kind of authentication factors is needed. 
The Figure 1 shows a typical application scenario under our requirement specifications. Proposed 
protocol would be implemented over these real equipments. A mini hotter, which is placed on the 
one’s chest, can measure people’s heart beat and breathe rate, described as ECG and PPG signals. 
IPIs can be generated from this information. A specialized application built in mobile can 
receives the data from these nodes by Bluetooth, generated a group of pattern vectors, and then 
transmits them to the server end for the sake of comparing with the legal/registered pattern 
vectors stored previously. Obviously, mobile plays a gateway at that time, and smart card id and 
user/password are also can be opted to enhance the security strength of the whole system if 
necessary. That’s the reason why this scheme is so called tri-factor authentication: a pair of 
username with password, a smart card with build-in variable security parameters to protect 
session and some kind of biometric features such as IPI pattern vectors. 
 
b. Pattern Vectors Generation 
As aforementioned, using biometrics methods to distinguish one bio entity from the others is 
getting more and more popular. According to our experiments, original ECG signals are 
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differentiable for different entities after necessary process of data fusion, just like shown in 
Figure 2. 
Servers
Cellular 
Networks
Terminal
BSNode
Mobile/
GateWay
Accelerometer
YA
XA
ZA
User Management
 
Figure 1. Application scenario of our protocol implemented 
 
 
Figure 2. Characteristics of ECG signal for different testers 
 
However, it is very hard to identify directly by wave shape in machine context, and we need to 
sample and convert it to digital entity identifier that appropriate for computer processing. Overall, 
the two categories of entity identifier generation scheme with biometrics ways are based on the 
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timing-domain information of physiological signals (TDPS) or frequency-domain information of 
physiological signals (FDPS) [23]. Our scheme takes advantage of timing information of heart-
beat, so the former is proper for this solution.  
Ref. [23] also analysis the characteristics of ECG and PPG signals, and gives the EI generation 
scheme based on IPI information. Figure 3 shows the extracted IPI information from the 
collected synchronous signals of ECG and PPG. 
 
Figure 3. Extract IPI from ECG and PPG signals collected synchronously 
 
In this EI generation scheme, based on a synchronization signal initiated by the master node, each 
sensor node extracts the timing-domain information by calculating a series of IPIs from its own 
recorded cardiovascular signal such as ECG and PPG, which can be denoted as {IPIi | 1  i N}, 
and then deployed on the series of IPIs of each end to generate its own EI. Given N consecutive 
individual IPIs, a series of multi-IPIs can be obtained as follows: 
1
{ |1 }
i
i n
n
mIPI IPI i N                              (1) 
Supposing a contraction mapping
^
:[0, 2 ) [0, 2 )L qf , where L is a positive integer referred to as 
a modulo parameter, and q is a small integer. So, the random of multi-IPIs and compensation of 
differences among various BSnode can be achieved by this mapping, i.e., equation (2) shows us, 
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^( )
( )
2 L q
m
f m                                                (2) 
where L > q and -  returns the largest integer less than or equal to ( )2 L q
m
. The generated EI can 
be expressed as EI= I1 || I2 ... || IL-1 || IN, where Ii is generated from a corresponding mIPIi with the 
bit length of q. Such generated EIs have a bit length of N × q. So far, we have the method to 
generate the pattern vectors represented by group of EIs. The recent progress about using IPIs as 
identifier is achieved by eliminating the error patterns [30] means the feasible of this application. 
 
c. The Proposed Protocol 
In a two-factor authentication scenario, a smart card is physically issued to the user who first 
registers to a system. Each user possesses a smart card for later login and authentication. Mobile 
USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module) card can be extended to load algorithms and 
security materials for this specific purpose. Also, a specific smartcard is another good option, e.g. 
USB key or SD (Secure Digital Memory) card. Based on the analysis of application requirements 
and disadvantages of the existing two-factor authentication scheme [1, 14, 15, 16], a novel tri-
factor authentication protocol is proposed in this study.  
First of all, we put forward a few facts as follows.  
(1) MGW provides time synchronization services and forwards messages to SE. 
(2) Whoever wants to use the system must register to MGW.  
(3) IPI patterns are used as the biometric authentication factor, each of which corresponds to a 
64-bit string, named PVi, represents the i
th
 pattern vector as section b depicted. The other two 
factors are user ID/password and a group of secure session parameters, respectively. The 
latter include independent temporary secret xa, generated by MGW as the session key and a 
symmetric key K preset into MGW. Both of them can be written into a smart card when 
starting authentications. 
(4) MGW can store and make comparison of registered IPI patterns when intermittent 
communications scheduled between BSn and MGW. SE has more PVs than MGW, and 
more than one subject can be differentiated concurrently. 
(5) BSn has the ability to collect IPIs and transmits a series IPIs to MGW to form a final pattern 
vector. 
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Secondly, we made a few necessary assumptions as follows:  
(1) Mobile device is a gateway and also an authenticator. 
(2) Seeing that secrets and biometrics are used, pattern vector is a key factor instead of password.  
(3) Users in this authentication scheme are classified into two groups according to applications, 
where one kind of users need to input password as they are not the subject under health 
monitoring and thus do not have biometric patterns, and the others are subjects who need to 
be verified by biometric patterns directly, assuming that two categories have no intersection. 
(4) Every BSn can be accessed by users via MGW authentication and provide data to requestors. 
At last, the proposed protocol analyzed and divided into 4 phases, namely request registration 
phase, login phase, authentication phase and security materials update phase. Each phase is 
described as below. 
(1) Request Registration Phase: sensors and owners who want to trigger the service of SE must 
initially register into MGW with their patterns. The other users also must be authenticated by 
MGW with user identifier and password. Use User to represent the set of {Oi, Sj, Uk}. MGW 
has initial IDk, PWk and PVi, all set to null value initially. 
Step1. User MGW: IDk, PWk, PVi 
Step2. MGW User: h(PWk || PVi), h(xa), N = h(IDk || h(PWk || PVi) || h(xa))⊕h(K || xa) 
Step3. MGW User: Smart card with the parameters {h(.), IDk, N, h(PWk || PVi), h(xa)} 
(2) Login Phase: there are three cases that require a login: BSn→SE: Physiological information 
for health analysis and alarming, where the login material is IPI pattern; Owner→BSn: 
Physiological information for monitoring and legitimate access, where the login material is 
IPIs pattern; other users→BSn: login materials are user identifier and password. Note that the 
first two cases are implied processes, and the last case is explicit. All of these login 
procedures should go through the MGW to get authenticated. If the user is successfully 
verified with the pair of values (IDk, PWk) or pattern vector (PVi) pre-stored in smart card, 
the following steps are then executed: 
Step1. Computes CID = h(IDk || h(PWk || PVi) || h(xa) )⊕h(h(xa) || T) and C = h(N || h(xa) || T), 
where T is the current timestamp of login activity 
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Step2. User→MGW: <CID, C, T> 
(3) Authentication Phase: upon receiving the login request <CID, C, T> at time T1, the MGW 
authenticates user by the following steps: 
Step1. Validate the timestamp by checking whether T1 – T < T or not, where T is the expected 
time interval for transmission delay. Only those requests with less than T can be accepted by 
MGW. 
Step2. Computes h(IDk || h(PWk || PVi) || h(xa))
* 
= CID⊕h(h(xa)||T) and C
* 
= h(h(IDk || h(PWk || 
PVi) || h(xa))
*⊕h(K || xa) || h(xa) ||T)) 
Step3. Checks if (C
*
== C) holds to accept login and continue to next steps; otherwise, rejects the 
request of user. 
Step4. MGW computes A = h(CID || h(Sj || xa) || T2), where T2 is current timestamp of the 
authentication step.  
Step5. MGW→Sj: <CID, A, T2>. A is used to verify whether the MGW is the real gateway or not, 
where the message originally comes from.  
Step6. Sj checks the time validity with T3 – T2 < T, where T3 is currently timestamp when Sj 
receives the message <CID, A, T2> at Step5. If T is expired, terminate the process or else 
continue to the next step. 
Step7. Sj computes A
* 
= h(CID || h(Sj || xa) || T2) and checks if (A==A
*
) holds to indicate the legal 
access to sensor node; otherwise, rejects the request. 
Step8. Sj computes M = h(h(Sj || xa) || T4) which is then provided to MGW for mutual 
authentication, where T4 is current timestamp. 
Step9. Sj → MGW: <M, T4>. 
Step10. At time T5, upon receiving the message, MGW also checks if (T5 – T4 < T) to continue; 
otherwise, terminate the process.  
Step11. MGW computes M
* 
= h(h(Sj || xa) || T4) and checks if (M==M
*
) holds to indicate the 
sensor Sj is legitimate and mutual authentication is accomplished 
Step12. As long as the aforementioned steps successfully passed, User can start the legal access 
to the system. 
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(4) Security Materials Update: besides the common password, pattern vectors are additional 
important security materials in this protocol. We denote the new password and the pattern 
vector as PW
*
k and PV
*
i. When user wants to update his/her materials, he or she inputs 
his/her new materials together with the old ones into the smart card, which can be a USIM 
card or a SD card, where the validation about whether the original and the fresh ones are 
matched is carried out. If yes, the following steps are executed: 
Step1. Computes N
*
 = N⊕h(IDk || h(PWk || PVi) || h(xa))⊕h(IDk || h(PW
*
k || PV
*
i) || h(xa)) 
Step2. Smart card replaces N with N
*
 and h(PWk || PVi) with h(PW
*
k || PV
*
i) 
As for those out dated vectors, just remove from patterns library on the server end directly. Any 
fresh requisition of authentication would be process from the registration phase again. In overall, 
we can summarize the whole authentication procedure with sequence diagram, as shown in 
Figure 4. 
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 Figure 4 Sequence diagram of authentication procedure 
 
 
 
 
IV. SECURITY ANAYLSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
a. Security Analysis 
Besides the security issues about guessing, replay, stolen-verifier, and node-compromise threats 
discussed in [6, 8, 11, 14], some further analyses about the security performance of our proposed 
scheme are needed after introducing pattern vector as an independent security factor.  
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(1) Forgery attack or impersonation attack. It always happens in wired and wireless networks. 
In our scheme, an attacker must possess the correct login information <CID, C, T> without 
prior legal registration phase. However, the secret xa, user password and pattern information 
are all protected by h(PWk || PVi) and h(xa), which are impossible to be used by attackers for 
impersonation. Moreover, it is impossible to generate the identical PVs from biometric 
patterns as long as the sensing source is different. 
(2) Gateway node by-passing attack. An attacker without passing the login from the MGW node 
can access the resources of sensor networks and a compromised sensor would possibly 
implicitly transmit malicious information to the server. To resolve this problem, xa should be 
only shared between the MGW node and legitimate sensors, and keep it secret from Oi and 
Uk. Moreover, xa shall be different according to the various applications. 
(3) Man-in-the-middle attacks. Attacker who wants to intercept and modify the login message 
<CID, C, T> to cheat the participants of communication, it is impossible to re-calculate this 
message without the knowledge of xa. Furthermore, our proposed protocol provided mutual 
authentication can overcome this crisis of confidence by computing A= h(CID||h(Sj||xa)||T2) 
to verify the legal gateway node and M=h(h(Sj||xa)||T4) to verify the legitimate sensors.. 
(4) Insider attack. More than 80% security issues come from the inside of networks. If 
privileged user controls the MGW node maliciously, all plaintext without hash protection 
will be leaked. Fortunately, the proposed scheme compute N = h(IDk || h(PWk || PVi) || h(xa))
⊕h(K || xa) and no plaint text of passwords or pattern vector are directly stored. 
(5) Denial-of-service attack. Adversary can block the message from reaching the node. From the 
point of the communication channel blocking, it is useless for the intruder that no responds 
any more if service is suspended in the public channel as well as no more information the 
attacker can get. However this protocol did not care the channel quality and not involved this 
case. From the point of the node blocking, only posses the password, pattern vector and 
secret of the node can be regarded as compromised and send malicious message to deny 
services. But these materials are protected and very hard to disclose or change arbitrarily as 
mentioned before, so the DoS attack by compromising node does not occur in this scheme. 
 
b. Implementation 
Chen-Guang He, Shu-Di Bao and Ye Li, A NOVEL TRI-FACTOR MUTUAL 
AUTHENTICATION WITH BIOMETRICS FOR WIRELESS BODY SENSOR NETWORKS IN HEALTHCARE APPLICATIONS
923
In our application, people can use a handy ECG collector specific developed as a biosensor to 
measure ones’ cardiac status, as Figure 5 (a) shows. And then, a series of digital IPI information 
is to make up of a pattern vector to transmit to a mobile gateway by Bluetooth. Of course, mobile 
can recover this information to ECG wave by dedicated Android app., as shown in Figure 5 (b). 
For visualization, we can compute one of the PV value in MatLab 7.0 simulation environment, 
e.g. a 64 bits length string: A6B76C8C493E61A0, as Figure 6 shows. However, mobile or server 
needs not to represent it directly for the sake of security issues. Moreover, server end 
environment is equipped with CentOS 6.0 and MongoDB software, in which stored physiological 
data and users’ general information.  
 
 
 
(a) ECG collector (b) Mobile with ECG wave recovery 
 Figure 5. BSn and MGW 
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 Figure 6. Simulation of PV pattern represented as a 64-bit string 
 
For a fresh user, he or she must also transfer his/her PV to back-end server as well as stored in 
MGW if he/she want to be a frequent legitimate user. So, a fresh user can register to server with a 
smart card recorded with PV string and user id/password (optional) to follow-up login stage. We 
utilize SD card within a validation program to simulate the smart card functions. Hence, after this 
user’s pattern vector string is generated and stored, he or she can login to MGW with optional ID 
and password with the interface and validate the PV while connecting to the physiological sensor 
(ECG collector) via Bluetooth, as shown in Figure 7(a) and (b), respectively. Here, mobile is 
regarded as an authenticator as well as a mobile gateway to transfer data between sensors and 
back-end server.  
Figure 8 shows the whole classes relationships of Android app which act as a data acquisitor and 
authenticator. LoginActivity called AuthenActivity not only by validating via ID/password but also 
by smart card information which IdentifyService provided. Furthermore, StartActivity has three 
activities are optional for user: one is MainActivity, one is HistoryActivity, and the rest one is 
UpdateActivity. The first class is utilized for main businesses such as ECG and PPG generating 
and showing (ECGPPGActivity and ECGPPGView) as well as initiating connection of Bluetooth 
with DeviceDiscovery, which is responsible for finding the available Bluetooth devices and list 
them by ListViewAdapte. After then GetBlueDataService called HandleThread to receive and 
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save data dynamically with a dedicated queue data structure implemented by class of 
CircularQueue. 
  
(a) Login interface on MGW (b) Connecting to the server to validate PV 
Figure 7. Login progress and validating via Bluetooth connecting 
 
 
Figure 8. Relationships of Android app classes in MGW 
 
In additon, back-end server plays another key role during authentication. All of registered user 
information including common data, physiological data authentication data are all stored in 
NoSQL database on the remote server. For example, a testing user’s storage status can be seen in 
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Figure 9 Smart card is assigned to this user previously with the stored value of “smartcard_id” 
attribute which indicates where can be found about the user’s legal privileges to handle device, 
own security materials and common keys. If the value of “smartcard_id” of current smart card is 
not consistent with the previous registered to the MGW, the authentication procedure should be 
terminated. With the correct smart card, the authentication routine can fetch the corresponding 
pre-set K and temporary session key xa by this id to process authentication procedure. 
 
Figure 9. User information stored in database 
 
Successively, the authentication event is lunched and recorded into another data collection, as 
Figure 10 shows. This item recorded the corresponding user’s PPG and ECG information. 
Therefore, the routine can seek the registered user’s detail by the id, e.g., “UserId: 
ObjectId(“50ea7a8ecf0a926055000001”)”, to proceed with the following mutual authentication. 
 
Figure 10. Details of event collection 
 
For any illegal user, at least one of the three factors is absent: Anyone who’s PV is not to be 
registered before, or can not match with the original one stored in database, as well as failing to 
compute secure proof in smart card, the whole authentication is failure. After analysis in segment 
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Section IV.(a), the adversaries is also hard to attack this proposed scheme without legal PV 
information, although the password or temporary session key may be comprised. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The security issues in BSN are paid more close attention with the popularization of biosensors 
applications. In addition to the traditional user-name/password pairs for user authentication, 
another novel method is to exploit the physiological characteristics readily available at individual 
sensors in BSN for entity identiﬁer generation to enhance the subsequent authentication process. 
Through the analysis of special security requirements for wireless body sensor networks with 
healthcare applications, we have proposed a protocol in this study to unify these cases with the 
set of User concept and construct a compound identifier to form a universal authentication 
material for the sake of convenience. Thanks to the special characteristic of physiological signals, 
e.g. ECG and PPG, more authentication factors like IPI pattern vectors besides user password can 
be deployed to increase the security level in addition to the secret xa and symmetric keys in the 
existing protocols. As a result, a novel tri-factor user authentication with mutual access can thus 
be designed specially for the sensor networks involved in healthcare applications. A real 
application system is also implemented with this mechanism. By bonding biometric and 
passwords, it has been proved that the security of the resultant authentication transaction is 
stronger than one or two-factor authentication schemes due to the independence among these 
multiple factors. The cryptanalysis of this protocol also indicates that the ability of resisting 
against attacks is strong and flexible enough. 
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